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Mahendra Lawoti
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Informal Institutions and Exclusion in
Democratic Nepal
Informal institutions, or conventions or codes of behavior, play significant roles in constraining
human behavior and have important political consequences. Despite much focus on institutionalism,
the role of informal institutions in political behaviors and outcomes has not been scrutinized
thoroughly in political science. This paper investigates the contribution of informal institutions to
the political exclusion of marginalized groups like Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, and
women in democratic Nepal (1990-2002). Scholars have pointed out the role of formal institutions
like the unitary state and the first past the post electoral method in the political exclusion of these
groups in Nepal. However, formal institutions do not account for all the exclusion. Not a single
Dalit was nominated to the cabinet during 1990-2002. This was not due to formal restrictions but
because of informal norms like the caste system that guide political and social actors’ behavior.
In this paper I will discuss various ways informal institutions interacted with formal institutions
during the democratic years to produce the political exclusion of marginalized groups. Specifically,
I will analyze the role of patriarchy on the exclusion of women, hill nationalism and the exclusion
of Madhesi, and caste system and Bahunbad and the exclusion of indigenous nationalities and
Dalit. Analyses of informal institutions are important because even if formal institutions are
changed, exclusion may still continue because informal institutions persist for long periods.

Despite the pervasiveness of informal institutions
and their widespread influence, they have largely
been ignored in the analysis of political behavior
and outcomes. Since formal institutions have failed
to adequately explain many political behaviors
and outcomes, informal institutions have begun to
attract the attention of political scientists (O’Donnell
1996; Lauth 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004).
Due to the new nature of the subfield, however, the
role of informal institutions, in many issues and
phenomena are yet to be rigorously analyzed. In this
paper, I analyze the role of informal institutions in
the political exclusion of marginalized groups using
a case study of Nepal during its 1990-02 democratic
years.1
This article will engage with, and contribute to
scholarship in fields of democratization, institutions,
and Nepal studies. It will contribute to the larger
1. Nepal’s first experience with democracy was from
1951-60. A monarchical regime ruled from 1960-90 after King
Mahendra dismissed an elected government in 1960. Democracy
was restored in 1990 and lasted till October 2002 when King
Gyanendra dismissed the elected government. He assumed direct
leadership of the executive in 2005 but was forced to give up
power in April 2006 by a popular movement. The monarchy was
eliminated in 2008 by the newly elected Constituent Assembly.

scholarship on democratization by attempting to
explain the continuation of political exclusion after
democratization begins. In the much accepted
conceptualization of democracy, Dahl (1971)
considers inclusion/participation as one of the two
dimensions of democratization (the other being
contestation). Over the years, more countries
have democratized and more people have obtained
franchise rights (Huntington 1991).
However,
despite expansion of adult enfranchisement, many
ethnic (national, linguistic, religious, caste, racial)
groups and women continue to be excluded from
governance in countries around the world (Gurr
2000). Scholars have pointed out that formal
majoritarian institutions like the first past the post
(FPTP) electoral system and unitary state structures
exclude minorities even in democracies (Horowitz
1994; Lijphart 1977). However, as the Nepali case
illustrates below, formal institutions do not explain
all levels of exclusion in polities. This paper will
demonstrate that informal institutions influence the
behavior of political and social actors, thus helping
to explain the ironic situation of exclusion from
governance despite formal inclusion at the franchise
level.
The 1990 Constitution of Nepal guaranteed
considerable political rights, civil liberties, and
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individual freedom. Moreover, it ensured reasonably free and
fair, periodic elections based on universal adult franchise.
What then explains the wide and deep level of political
exclusion that continued in the polity? I begin by briefly
reviewing exclusion in democratic Nepal.

Exclusion in Democratic Nepal, 1990-2002
Nepal, which is a country of more than sixty ethnic
groups, one hundred languages, and half a dozen religions,
has witnessed exclusion, discrimination, and domination
of various groups in many spheres including socio-cultural,
economic and political. The caste hill Hindu elite (CHHE
or CHHEM when women are omitted) which consists of the
“upper” caste Chhetri, Bahun, Thakuri, Sanyasi and “upper”
caste Newar of the hills,2 are numerically a minority; yet,
they overwhelmingly dominate the political, social, and
economic realms in Nepal. The indigenous nationalities
(adibasi janajati), Dalit (the traditional ‘untouchable’ Hindus)
and Madhesi3 (residents of the plains who share culture with
North Indian societies) collectively constitute more than two
thirds of the population but were discriminated against and
excluded from various socio-political realms.4
2. The Newar, a multi-caste indigenous group from the Kathmandu
Valley, make up 5.48 percent of the population and have enjoyed highly
disproportionate access to socio-economic and political power, mostly by the
‘upper castes’ within the group. However, as a group it has faced linguistic
and other cultural discrimination.
3. CHHE, indigenous nationalities, and Dalit were 30.89, 36.31
(including Newar) and 14.99 percent of the population respectively in
2001. Madhesi are 12.30 percent if only non-Dalit caste Hindus are
counted and they are 32.29 percent when Tarai indigenous nationalities
(8.96 %), Tarai Dalit (6.74 %), and Muslim (4.29 %) are counted. Some
Tarai Dalit and indigenous nationalities and Muslim prefer to identify as
Madhesi while others reject the Madhesi identity. Organizations of Tarai
indigenous nationalities and Muslims launched street movements in early
2009 to protest their categorization as Madhesi by the government under the
pressure of the 2007 and 2008 Madhesi movements. Within the Madhesi,
the ‘upper’ caste groups are less excluded from socio-economic and political
power.
4. The Dalit, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi and women are not
homogenous groups and the level of exclusion and discrimination varies
among different subgroups. The Dalit are not only divided as hill and Tarai
Dalit but caste stratification also exists among them. Likewise, the Madhesi
are divided into various caste, religious (Hindu, Muslim, and animist),
linguistic, and ethnic divisions (indigenous versus caste groups). The
indigenous nationalities are divided along ethnic, linguistic, and religious
lines while women are divided along caste, ethnic, religious, and regional
identity. However, members of different categories face some common
discrimination. For example, the Dalit face the harmful consequences of
untouchability, indigenous nationalities suffer linguistic, religious and
cultural discrimination, the Madhesi endure linguistic discrimination and
unequal treatment as citizens, and women are confronted with patriarchical
discrimination (for societal complexity, see Bista 1996; Lawoti 2005;
Bhattachan 2008; Gurung 1998).
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Govinda Neupane (2000) showed the overwhelming
dominance of the CHHE and Newar in twelve influential
arenas in 1999: the executive branch, parliament, the
judiciary, public administration, the security forces, politics
(i.e. local government and party leadership), leadership of
academia, industry and commerce, civil society, and cultural
associations. Jointly the CHHE and Newar were 36.37 percent
of the population according to the 2001 census but held 80
percent of the State’s leadership positions in important arenas
(e.g. executive, legislature, judiciary, public administration and
security elite) in 1999. Their domination included holding 95
percent of the position in the civil administration, 91 percent
of the judiciary, 80 percent of positions in the constitutional
commissions, 72 percent of positions in the cabinet, and a
68 percent representation in Parliament (both houses). Even
the relatively progressive realms like academia, the media,
and civil society had a negligible presence of marginalized
groups. The combined CHHE and Newar dominance in
the leadership of professional bodies of cultural, academic,
science-technology, and civil society was 95, 89, 87, and 91
percent respectively. Overall, the hill Dalit (7.09 % population)
had 0.3 percent representation in the twelve sectors while
the indigenous nationalities (21.85% - not including Newar
and Tarai indigenous nationalities) and Madhesi (32.33% including Madhesi Dalit and Tarai indigenous nationalities)
had 7 and 11 percent representation respectively in the twelve
influential sectors (Neupane 2000).
Likewise, women were severely underrepresented in the
cabinet and the Supreme Court had no female justices during
the 1990s. The representation of women in the Parliament
and central committees of major political parties never
crossed six and ten percent respectively. Representation in
the bureaucracy was around seven percent and less than one
percent at the first class officer level and above (The World
Bank and DFID 2006).
The extreme exclusion prevalent in Nepal can be better
understood with the example of the Dalit. Except for one
person in the teaching and academic leadership and four
members in the Upper House of the Parliament, which is
relatively powerless, there was no Dalit in any leadership
position in the remaining ten social, political, and economic
sectors Neupane (2000) investigated.
One of the consequences of political exclusion from
influential decision making bodies was the absence of
political reform that could address the deep discrimination
and exclusion faced by marginalized groups. The absence
of reforms resulted in the continuation of inequalities and
exclusion because no new policies meant the continuation
of the previous policies and discriminatory practices. The
inequalities and exclusion alienated the marginalized groups
and exacerbated the armed Maoist conflict initiated in 1996
that eventually contributed to the breakdown of democracy
(Lawoti 2009) by contributing to a higher participation of
some of the marginalized groups. Likewise, a large number
of armed Madhesi and indigenous organizations have

emerged after democracy was restored in 2006 to fight against
inequality and exclusion (Pathak and Uprety 2009).

Formal and Informal Institutions
Institutions significantly affect different aspects of
politics, including representation and quality of democracy.
I follow North (1990: 3) in defining institutions, which are
“the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”
The new institutionalism that emerged in the eighties in
political science analyzed the effect of formal institutions
or “rules and procedures that are created, communicated,
and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as
official.” However, formal institutions do not explain major
political behaviors such as clientelism, corruption, executivelegislature relations, etc. (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 5;
O’Donnell 1996). The fact that corruption occurs despite
formal restrictions is ample proof that formal institutions are
inadequate in explaining some political behaviors. Hence,
despite the difficulties in studying informal institutions
because by definitions they are unwritten and difficult
to identify and measure, they should be investigated to
fully understand the causes and consequences of political
phenomena, especially because they are pervasive while
formal institutions make only “a small (although very
important) part of the sum of constraints that shape choice”
(North 1990: 36).
Informal institutions are “typically unwritten codes of
conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules” (North
1990, 4). These are “created, communicated, and enforced
outside of the officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and
Levitsky 2004, 725). However, to “be considered an informal
institution, a behavioral regularity must respond to an
established rule or guideline, the violation of which generates
some kind of external sanction” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006:
6-7).
Informal institutions interact with formal institutions
to produce varied outcomes. Lauth (2000) discusses three
types of informal institutions based on their interactions
with formal institutions: complementary, substituting and
conflicting. Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 2006) expand Lauth’s
typology by classifying conflicting informal institutions into
accommodating and competing subgroups and present four
types of informal institutions based on outcomes (convergent
versus divergent) that result upon interaction with formal
institutions (effective versus ineffective). Complementary
informal institutions “enhance the efficiency or effectiveness”
of effective formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006:
13). Substitutive informal institutions achieve what formal
institutions were designed, but failed, to achieve” (ibid:
16) because the formal rules are rarely enforced. The
outcomes are convergent in both the cases. The other two
types of informal institutions produce divergent outcomes.
Competing informal institutions coexist with ineffective
formal institutions and “structure incentives in ways that are
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incompatible with the formal rules…[and] generate outcomes
that diverge markedly from what is expected from formal
rules” (ibid: 15). Accommodative informal institutions “create
incentives to behave in ways that alter the substantive effects
of formal rules, but without directly violating them.” They
“contradict the spirit, but not the letter, of the formal rules”
(ibid: 15).
The analysis of informal institutions is important because,
among other reasons, their affects persist for a long time.
Some informal rules, in fact, may endure changes in formal
rules, even though they might slightly change, because
informal institutions are culturally derived5 and cultural
norms take a longer time to change (North 1990). Thus,
despite the ongoing political changes in Nepal that began in
April 2006, and the dismantling of some of the exclusionary
formal institutions (such as Hindu state and discriminatory
constitutional articles) and the adoption of inclusive formal
structures in the “new Nepal,” exclusion could decrease but
may also continue due to the influence of discriminating
informal institutions.

Political Exclusion and Institutions in Nepal
Scholars have established the role of formal institutions like
the unitary state, the FPTP electoral method and constitutional
articles in the continued exclusion of marginalized groups in
Nepal even after democracy was restored in 1990 (Lawoti
2005; Khanal 2004; Bhattachan 1999). The state was
formally declared Hindu and it treated non-Hindu and
‘low’ caste Hindus unequally. The unitary state favored the
dominant group. As the largest group, the CHHE controlled
the central government and formulated public policies based
on its values and interests. The unitary state facilitated the
imposition of such public policies over other groups around
the whole country. The formal institutions, however,
explain only some part of the political exclusion of the Dalit,
indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, minority religious groups,
and women. For instance, not a single Dalit was nominated
to the cabinet during the entire 1990-02 democratic years.
Some of the cabinets had no women while only one or two
women were included in others. These exclusions and under
representations were not due to formal restrictions. Had
ethnic oriented parties been awarded seats proportionally,
based on the popular votes they received in the parliamentary
elections of 1990s, they would have received more seats than
under the FPTP electoral method; however, the marginalized
groups would still have been heavily underrepresented in
the Parliament. During the 1999 parliamentary election,
the Sadbhawana Party (Nepal Goodwill Party or NSP) of
the Madhesi and Nepal Jana Mukti Party (Nepal People’s
Liberation Party or NJMP) of the indigenous nationalities
5. Formal institutions may also be culturally derived but not always so.
Formal institutions that are derived from the local culture could be enduring
and very effective as they are enforced through state power and societal
norms.
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would have received seven and three seats respectively if a
pure proportional method had been employed instead of five
and none respectively under the FPTP. The FPTP electoral
method contributed in the exclusion but it is not responsible
for all the exclusion. Informal institutions help to explain the
unaccounted part of this political exclusion.
Although not articulated as informal institutions, informal
institutions have been, nonetheless, analyzed as a cause of
marginalization of various caste and non-caste groups in Nepal.
A lot of anthropological work that examined the relationship
among high caste Hindus and others have discussed the role
of caste structure in the marginalization of the latter groups
(Guneratne 2002; Caplan 1972; Caplan 1970; Gaige 1975). A
number of works (Sharma 1977; Gurung 1988) analyze the
phenomenon of what Srinivas (1956) called Sanskritization.
Jones argues that even though the term may indicate upward
mobilization as suggested by Srinivas, in eastern Nepal it in
fact harmed the Limbu, who were not part of a caste system
by incorporating them in the caste systems in a status lower
than that of the Bahun and Chhetri, even though they were
autonomous group outside the caste system. Others have
discussed how the caste system has excluded various lower
and non-caste groups and women (Yakharai 1996; Cameron
1998). Bista’s classic work on the underdevelopment of Nepal
also discusses various informal institutions like chakari
(sycophancy), afno manche (inner circle) etc. that contributed
to the marginalization of indigenous groups and lower
castes. However, Bista (as well as the work of others) draws
mainly on materials from non-democratic periods or they do
not explicitly analyze the phenomena from an institutional
framework. These works also do not look at the effect of
institutions on democratic politics and their consequences on
marginalized groups. Furthermore, works to date on Nepal
do not look explicitly at how formal and informal institutions
interacted to produce varied outcomes.
My assumption is not that informal institutions do not exist
in democracy. Rather, I am interested in whether institutions,
and what type of institutions, affect democratic polities and
in what ways. One would assume that as different sections
of the society get more political rights and civil liberties in
a democratizing polity, their situation would improve as
the groups begin to assert and use their rights. Indeed, the
mobilization of marginalized groups exploded after 1990
in Nepal. However, that did not lead to increases in their
representation in the Parliament, cabinet, bureaucracy, and
judiciary. The indigenous nationalities saw a decline in their
representation in the Parliament and bureaucracy compared
to the earlier democratic (1959-60) and non-democratic
(1960-1990) period. The Madhesi and Muslim representation
increased slightly in the 1991 parliament but then declined
in the next two Parliaments, and not a single Dalit was
nominated to the executive in the entire period. Likewise, no
one from the Dalit, Muslim and the non-Newar indigenous
groups were nominated to the Supreme Court (Lawoti 2008;
Neupane 2000). Women did see incremental increases in
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representation in various sectors but this could have been due
to temporal factors – women’s representation had been slowly
increasing for some years (Acharya 1994).
I have extensively investigated the role of formal
institutions in this exclusion (Lawoti 2005, 2007, 2008); but,
as was pointed out earlier, formal institutions do not explain
all the deep rooted exclusion of marginalized communities. In
this article, I argue that informal institutions both separately
and sometimes as a result of interactions with the formal
sector, contributed significantly to the exclusion of Dalits,
Muslims, and others from the political process. I will discuss
particular informal institutions that have contributed to the
exclusion of the Dalit, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi,
Muslims, and women during Nepal’s democratic interregnum
of 1990-2002.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE
This paper draws on data obtained during my dissertation
research in 2000-2001 which explored the role of political
institutions in the exclusion of various groups in Nepal
and from subsequent regular field visits. Initially, I did not
analyze exclusion from an informal institution framework
even though I had collected data on stereotyping, the impact
of caste etc. The data is based on interviews with leaders,
common people and activists from the Dalit, indigenous
nationalities, Madhesi, Muslims, and women as well as the
Bahun and Chhetri. It also includes focus group interviews,
archival research, an extensive literature review, and the
observations about exclusion in Nepal for a decade, seen from
a native eye.
My aim here is to go beyond an ethnographic study of
particular groups and compare exclusion of various groups
using informal institutions as my independent variable. By
doing this, I hope to establish the role of informal institutions
more firmly than a case study of a single group can. A rich
ethnographic study peppered by thick description may tell
us a lot about certain phenomena regarding a group but the
generalizability of such a study is questionable. Generalizability
increases if the same phenomenon is found in more cases
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). By looking at the impact
of informal institutions on the political exclusion of the Dalit,
indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, and women, I hope to
firmly establish the contribution of informal institutions to
this process. This article does not aim to discuss all forms of
exclusion faced by different groups, or all aspects of informal
institutions, nor exclusion of all categories, such as class. To
some extent, however, class and identity overlap in Nepal. For
example, most Dalit are poor. Even though an investigation
of class dimension would be interesting, it is beyond the
confines of this article.
Furthermore, this article will not analyze how the
marginalized groups resist domination. This does not
mean that I assume that the marginalized groups are
passive recipients of the informal institutions’ impact. In
fact, marginalized groups have engaged in covert and overt

resistance and rebellions. Academics have analyzed a few
past overt resistance by ethnic groups (Lecomte-Tilouine
2003; Gaenszle 2009), religious sects (Uprety 1992) and
women (Aziz 1993). Other instances of resistance have
been mentioned (Gurung 2004; Caplan 1970; Jones 1976;
Lawoti 2007; Regmi 1995; Neupane 2000) but have not been
described and analyzed in detail. Likewise, as mentioned
earlier, the post 1990 years saw large scale mobilizations of
people along lines of identity (Lawoti 2007, 2005; Gellner,
Pfaff-Czarnecka, and Whelpton 1997; Bhattachan 2000),
including gender and class, e.g. the Maoist rebellion (see Hutt
2004; Lawoti and Pahari 2009).
Hangen (2005; 2007) has pointed out how non-Hindu
Gurungs have boycotted the Hindu festival of Dashain as a
protest and formed their own ethnic parties to fight against
Hindu domination and exclusionary practices. Holmberg
(2000) has shown that the Tamang engaged in the derision of
the ruling elite during their religious rituals in an attempt to
retain group autonomy and symbolic power. Maharjan (2007)
discusses participation in Theravada Buddhism as a way of
protest by Newars in the Kathmandu valley. Additionally,
Guneratne (2002) shows how different language speaking
communities created a Tharu identity to encompass a larger
population in their struggle against the state dominated by
hill Hindus.
Overt direct and indirect opposition, however, are not the
only forms of resistance. As Scott (1985; 1989) has amply
demonstrated, common people engage in everyday resistance
to subvert domination. They lie about things if they cannot
openly rebel, remain non-committal, arrive late, make
excuses, engage in malicious gossips about powerful people,
embrace passive noncompliance, evade and deceive, drag
their feet, encroach upon lands controlled by the local elite
and the state, pilfer, commit sabotage and arson, and desert
the military during war. Agarwal (1994, chapter 9) discusses
a variety of ways women resist, bargain for or protect their
interests including hiding their income and cash in multiple
places to prevent husbands from discovering and spending
all their savings, acting as if spirits have possessed them to
make demands and complaints, withholding sex, telling
jokes and singing songs to express dissatisfaction and make
fun of men, threatening to return to their natal home, playing
off male affines and consanguines against each other, refusing
to speak, and eating good food when males are not around.
One can plausibly argue that marginalized groups in Nepal
are also engaged in various forms of covert resistance.
These overt, covert and indirect forms of resistance are
all very interesting activities and they have contributed in
protecting the rights of marginalized groups. However, my
aim is not to explicate how such overt and covert resistance
contributed to the protection of the interests of these groups,
including in their political representation. My aim instead is
to see how and in what ways informal institutions may have
contributed to the political exclusion of various marginalized
groups. The assumption I make in this article is that
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marginalized groups may have resisted but that the informal
institutions apparently overcame their resistance to contribute
to their continued exclusion and domination. Not analyzing
their forms of resistance does not weaken my findings. That
their exclusion continues despite their resistance supports my
thesis that informal institutions matter.

PATRIARCHY AND EXCLUSION OF WOMEN
Women in Nepal have been legally excluded in political
and social realms (Tamang 2000; FWLD 2000) but informal
norms and practices have also played a major role in their
exclusion. A good illustration is the low percentage of voting
by women. According to the UNDP’s Human Development
Report (2004) (Annex 2.1, table 7), women’s participation
was on average less than 20 percent in the local elections
held in the 1990s. This occurred despite universal adult
enfranchisement.
The argument here is not that women belonging to
different ethnic groups, castes, regions, religions, and classes
face the same level of exclusion. The varied impact of the
social exclusion faced by women hailing from different groups
due to religious ideology, kinship structure, and access to the
political elite will be pointed out in the discussion below. It
has, in fact, been shown that government affirmative action
policies have benefitted the ‘high’ caste hill women (Sob 1997;
Manandhar and Bhattachan 2001; Tamang 1997).
Social practices and norms at the household, family, and
society levels are major factors in discrimination against and
the marginalization of women, and they cannot be eliminated
by ending legal discrimination alone. Patriarchy is the root
informal institution that has disadvantaged women across
all ethnic/caste groups and classes even though its impact
is varied across caste, ethnic and religious groups. I define
patriarchy, following Mead, Khanam and Nahar (1979), as “a
set of social relations with a material base that enables men to
dominate women.” It may be sustained by aspects of religion,
kinship, political systems, social structures, and men’s
control over property (land, house etc.), income and women’s
labor. Patriarchy puts women in a dominated position within
households, extended family and society, and constrains
them from participating in politics, economic activities and
society in general.

Religious Traditions, Patriarchy, and Exclusion
In Nepal, Hindu and Muslim religions in particular have
enhanced and sustained patriarchy while women belonging
to indigenous groups that either do not follow the major
religious traditions or are less exposed to them are less likely
to be impacted. Likewise, the hold of patriarchy is weaker
on the ‘lower’ caste Dalit because they have less access to
land and the other resources through which patriarchy is
often mediated, and less attachment to the concept of purity
(Cameron 1998). On the other hand, patriarchy’s hold on
‘high’ caste women is very strong: “from crib to cremation, a
woman’s life in Hindu culture is circumscribed, regimented,
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exploited, caged, consumed and destroyed by religionpoisoned society” (Mishra 1997: 347). Religious traditions
and beliefs, such as sons necessary to perform after-deathrituals for dead persons, have made boys more important than
girls. The treatment of women as objects of purity in major
religious traditions constrains their free public movement to
supposedly ‘protect’ their purity. One such practice secludes
women and undermines their role in the public sphere.
During the monthly menstruation period women, especially
in the ‘high’ caste, are considered to be impure and have to
spend the period in isolation to avoid defiling others through
contact. Such practices constrain women’s independence and
may undermine their dignity.
The notion that women do not belong in the public sphere,
another form of seclusion also undergrided by religious
traditions, is another important patriarchal norm contributing
to the exclusion of women. The norm stipulates that women’s
place is in the private sphere of bearing and raising children,
taking care of the household and families, etc. whereas the
public sphere like politics, market activities, and civil society
belong to the men (Okin 1991; Young 1990). Women are
disadvantaged by being relegated to the private sphere. First,
household work is often not considered as ‘real’ work, not
assessed accordingly, and is unpaid. Second, the work takes
so much time that it makes women ‘poor’ with regard to time.
Studies found that women could not participate in training
opportunities and meetings because of too many household
responsibilities (Cornwell 2003; The World Bank and DFID
2006, 36). The notion of public versus private is less common
however among the indigenous nationalities, whose women
are active in economic and other activities beyond the
household (Acharya 2000).

Kinship Structure
Kinship structures reinforce patriarchy and exclusion
by increasing vulnerability of women and making them
dependent upon men, for example to their father when they
are young, their husband during adult life and their sons
in old age. The practice of patrilocal marriage among most
communities in Nepal removes women from their family
and village of birth and attenuates women’s relationship to
the natal family through distance and norms that restricts
frequent visit to natal home. Among other things, it increases
their vulnerability because they have to start life in a new
place and build networks all over again. In competitive
politics, it puts them at a disadvantage with males who have
established networks in areas where they have always lived
(Agarwal 1994). Second, as women move away and may not
be around in old age to look after them, many parents invest
more in sons (e.g. education, food). Thus, women in general
may not acquire skills and capabilities necessary to become
competitive in the economy, the society and politics.
Furthermore, unequal land holdings between men and
women (see next section) is also facilitated by the practice
of women moving away from the birth home after marriage.
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Even when women are awarded equal inheritance rights they
might have to sell off the land or may be obligated to give it to
brothers to keep the option of returning to their natal home
open in case of marital problems. Even if women keep land
after marriage, husbands often become the de facto owners of
the properties (Agarwal 1994).

Control over Resources
Male control over the resource base also hinders women’s
independence, development and subsequent participation in
the public sphere. Land, houses, and livestock are the most
valuable form of property to the large rural farming population
in Nepal. They are often held in the name of male family
members. According to the World Bank and DFID (2006:
24), “[o]nly about 11 percent of households reported any land
in female legal ownership; six percent reported that women
had ‘some’ ownership of a house…Surprisingly, only seven
percent reported female ownership of livestock, even though
for many groups livestock rearing is traditionally a female
task.” This skewed property ownership is due to both formal
and informal norms. Nepal’s discriminatory inheritance laws
have been reformed to some extent6 but even the new laws
did not change the unequal property holdings. Despite the
reforms, the informal norms of preferring sons continue to
favor men in the distribution of parental and family resources.
The lack of resources makes women dependent upon men,
materially and psychologically. If women want to engage in
business and want to take out loans, they will have to ask
male relatives to put property up as collateral.7 Without
financial independence, it is generally difficult to participate
and succeed in politics.

Male Dominated Political System
The political system which is heavily dominated
by men has contributed to creating a vicious circle
of exclusion. First, it discourages women from
participating in politics and undermines their role in
the formulation of socio-economic policies (Lama 1997;
Manandhar and Bhattachan 2001). Second, it has deprived
women of role models. Third, women may also be constrained
in politics because society - and men particularly - may not
treat such women with respect and dignity. They may be
given denigrating names for interacting with non-family
men. In competitive politics, women are more vulnerable
to oppositional attacks and a significant part of the society
may not vote for them because they will be seen as engaging
in activities where women are ‘not supposed to be.’ Fourth,
the “men’s club” may also not share all information and
6. Unmarried daughters are entitled equal inheritance under the
reforms while earlier only sons were entitled.
7. Observations from villages in East Nepal and Kathmandu. however,
sometimes male relatives borrow gold and other jewelry from women to put
up as collateral to take out loans from banks or money lenders. Rich women
thus may have some leverage.

resources with women. Men socialize among themselves
and this deprives women from getting tips and support that
informal networks provide. Even if they are let into the inner
circles it may be due to ‘enlightened’ leader(s) and this may
make women dependent on such patron. Fifth, women
activists have said that many women do not engage in politics
because it’s guided by masculine values of fierce competition
that could involve physical altercations (Lama 1997), while
women in some ethnic groups are often socialized into being
submissive from an early age. Finally, as women are perceived
as uncompetitive by male political leaders, it lessens their
chances of being recruited for competitive politics.
It could be argued that a reason for the low participation of
women may be their lack of education, skills, and capabilities.
Even so, this absence is due to patriarchy that favors sons
over girls in education, opportunities, food, and other
arenas. Infant and under-five mortality rates for girls have
been persistently higher than for boys in Nepal (The World
Bank and DFID 2006: 26).8 On the other hand, studies from
rich but conservative societies have shown that social norms
restrict even educated women. For example, women in Middle
Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia are highly educated
but are not allowed to work in many professions (Morrison
and Jutting 2005). Nepal does not have similar levels of
restrictions but it is naive to assume that educated women,
as well as women from the Dalit, indigenous nationalities
and Madhesi groups more generally, do not face problems in
politics and job markets.
Patriarchy operates in two ways to reproduce and
reinforce exclusion of women. First, patriarchal norms (an
informal institution), such as those that consider women to
be subordinate, competes with ineffective formal institutions
(gender equality laws) and produces divergent outcomes of
female exclusion. Secondly, patriarchal norms that support
the discriminating formal institutions, such as unequal
inheritance law, are complementary informal institutions.
They reinforce exclusionary formal institutions to entrench
exclusion.

HILL HINDU CASTE SYSTEM AND EXCLUSION
While patriarchy contributes to the pervasive exclusion
of women, the hill Hindu ‘upper’ caste system and its values
contribute to the widespread exclusion of non-CHHE groups.
By definition the hierarchical caste system privileges some
groups while discriminating against others. The Nepali
caste system excludes the Dalit through the practice of
“untouchability,” indigenous nationalities by labeling them as
‘lower’ caste and by not recognizing their culture and identity,
and the Madhesi by lowering their caste ranks compared to
co-hill castes (Dastider 1995; Gaige 1975; Yadav 1997; Lawoti
2005; Biswakorma 2003; Kisan 2005). Untouchability,
cultural domination, and exclusionary nationalism affect all
8. Under-five Mortality Rate per thousand was 91.2 for boys and 112.4
for girls in 2001.
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groups to some extent but the discussion that follows will
make it clear that each phenomenon affected one particular
group more than it does others.
The socio-cultural-political hegemony based on the
CHHE value-influenced caste system, and the reproduction of
an unequal society through it, has been labeled as Bahunism
by the father of Nepali anthropology Dor Bahadur Bista
(1991). Many find the formulation helpful to explain Nepal’s
social inequality and underdevelopment (Bhattachan 1999;
Yakharai 1996; Biswakorma 2003; Metz 1996; Sharma 1991;
Neupane 2000) while some members from the dominant
group have rejected the concept and term outright.9 Dahal
(1990) and Pahari (1992) have pilloried the book showing
“contradictions” and suggesting a failure to analyze alternative
hypotheses and establish cause and effect. However, the
criticisms have been criticized for being “one sided, negative
statements,” attempts at disproving generalizations by showing
exceptions, missing the forest for the trees, and criticizing an
inductive and ethnographic study whose aim was not to test
hypotheses and establish cause and effect (Bennett 1992: 4-5).
Many find the concepts useful and have expanded them to
explain underdevelopment and the exclusion of marginalized
groups (Kamata 1999; Macfarlane 2001; Neupane 2000).
Alan Macfarlane (1994, 115), a prominent anthropologist,
finds Bista’s book Fatalism and Development so insightful
that he compares it with De Tocqueville’s Ancien Regime,
Weber’s Protestant Ethic, and Taine’s Notes upon England. If
Bahunism is understood as an imposition of one’s culture and
values on others through domination over the state and the
legitimizing of the superior position of certain groups based
on ascription, then the concept describes a powerful informal
institution that has helped to perpetuate social inequality
and hegemonic domination in Nepal (Neupane 2000; Lawoti
2005; Malla 1992).10 The wide adoption of the concept by
9. Bahunism could become a racist epithet if applied to all Bahuns.
There is a widespread stereotype that Bahuns are crafty, cunning and
conspiring. Like any stereotype, this is not true with regard to all Bahuns
but is based on the devious behaviors of some individuals, which has
been recorded by anthropologists (Bista 1991; Caplan 1970; Caplan 1972;
Guneratne 2002), including a Bahun (Dahal 2036 v.s.). Such individuals
have, in fact, harmed decent Bahuns indirectly by helping to create and
perpetuate stereotypes. Bahuns have also been directly harmed by cunning
Bahuns but probably less than individuals from other groups because the
caste system and social networks protect them to some extent.
10. The term Bahunism does not strictly reflect the caste system but
rather signifies power enjoyed by Bahun (hill Brahmin) and Thakuri and
their use of that power to reformulate the caste system to place them in
superior positions and to legitimize those positions based on ascription.
Caste laws of 1854 in Nepal rendered Bahuns and Thakuris higher than the
Tarai Brahmin, who follow the Hindu rituals of purity and vegetarianism
more rigorously and who are traditionally ranked higher (see Hofer 2004,
figure 2, p.9). The Thakuri is listed below the Upadhaya Bhraman but higher
than the Jaisi Brahman, Chetri, Newar Braman, Indian Brahmin, ascetic sects,
lower Jaisi and various Newar castes in the tagadhari, the highest category.
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scholars and marginalized groups is resisted by many male
Bahuns.11 This validates the claim that caste is an important
factor by demonstrating that resistance is based on caste
identity.
This caste system, based on the values of dominant hill
Hindu groups, has helped to reproduce severe political
exclusion of other ethnic groups and women, which continued
even during the democratic years. Bahuns, in particular,
increased their dominance in politics after 1990 while most
other groups’ representation, including that of the Chhetri and
Newar, the other two dominant groups, declined. There is no
denying that high educational attainment contributed to the
social mobility of Bahuns, but better educational attainment
itself was the result of a more or less historic monopoly
over education and contemporary policies that privileged
Bahuns, who received instruction in their native language as
well as free education in Sanskrit. Educational attainment
alone, however, does not explain the group’s hegemony. If
educational attainment alone were a factor, then the Newar
should have improved their performance as well because in
addition to being better off socio-economically, which also
fosters mobility, their educational attainment is high.
Hill casteism prevalent in the polity works to advantage
the hill ‘high’ caste and disadvantage ‘low’ castes and others in
several ways. First, the system marginalizes ‘lower’ castes and
others and renders them uncompetitive. For example, lower
education levels among marginalized groups due to historic
and contemporary policy bias (e.g. education in a language
other than their mother tongue) made the marginalized
groups less competitive (Yadav 1992; Ragsdale 1989).
Second, caste based nepotism and favoritism, which guides
politics and other spheres, advantaged the hill ‘high’ caste
groups in politics. Supreme leaders often promote caste
loyalists. Generally, they feel secure and comfortable with
family and caste members who share a similar worldview,
language, culture and religion and are socially permitted
to enter their households, participate in their rituals, etc.12
Empirical analysis of the parliament trends supports this
thesis. During the Panchayat period, when the king was
supreme, the king’s caste group (Thakuris) and Chhetris
dominated the Parliament overwhelmingly, holding 37.2
percent of the seats, while Bahuns held only 20 percent. On
the other hand, during 1990-02, when the Bahuns dominated
the political party leadership, they overwhelmingly dominated
the Parliament with 39 percent of seats while the Chhetris,
who are around 50 percent more than Bahuns in terms of the
national population, declined to 19.6 percent (Lawoti 2008).
Caste based nepotism has often sidelined competent persons
11. I have found that rejection is more widespread among many
“educated” male Bahuns and some Chhetris active in online Nepali forums
dedicated to “democracy,” “environment” etc.
12. Traditionally the Dalit are often not allowed to enter households
while all ‘lower’ castes are generally barred from entering the kitchens and
participating in ‘high’ caste rituals.
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of other groups. Yakharai (1996) describes an incident where
a Bahun minister and secretary promoted junior civil servants
of their caste over other senior and competent bureaucrats
by giving their caste protégés full points in interviews to
overcome other bureaucrats’ higher marks in other arenas of
evaluation such as written tests and service length.

Figure 1: Caste and Political Representation

Third, with CHHE domination in politics, administration
and other spheres, marginalized groups faced differential
consequences in their lives. For example, nearly 60 percent
of the prisoners in three Kathmandu jails were Dalit and
indigenous nationalities. The disproportionate imprisonment
of the groups was largely because ‘low’ caste people were
victimized by the ‘high’ caste administration while the ‘high’
caste were either not similarly effected or were able to use
caste network and influence in the system so as not to get
imprisoned or get out of jail quickly (Nepal 2006). Such
differential consequences due to the unfavorable conditions
are prevalent in other spheres.
Marriage (endogamous), socialization, religious rituals,
family and other kinship networks tie the ‘high’ caste group
together and contribute to their social mobility because
powerful political leaders and administrators hail from the
group. Such networks provide opportunities for mobility to
cadres and socio-political insurance to leaders by facilitating
monitoring of ‘clients’ or people they have rewarded, making
them effective institutions of discrimination and exclusion.
Chandra (2007) argues that monitoring is easier along ethnic
lines because ethnic identity makes available more easily
information necessary for monitoring. If people betray their
patrons, the dissenters could face consequences from social,
family, and caste associations and networks.
The misunderstanding, discomfort, and conflict due
to cultural differences, on the other hand, have harmed
members of the marginalized groups. For instance, some
Madhesi and indigenous nationalities’ Parliament members
from CPN-UML (Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist
Leninist) were censured for raising issues pertaining to their

respective groups in the party forum. Such punishment and
suspicion by top CHHEM leaders undermined the careers of
the marginalized group leaders. Some left the parties that
they had invested considerable time and energy in.13 The
exit by leaders, ironically, further reduced the presence of
marginalized groups in major political parties.
The discussion of influence of hill based caste systems in
politics does not mean that it is the only factor that influences
political behavior and outcomes. Individual ability, and
control or influence over resources also affects politics.
Members of ‘lower’ caste groups could control these resources
as well, though it is rare in reality. However when everything
else is constant, the hill Hindu-value influenced caste system
prevalent in the society helps in the upward mobility of ‘higher’
hill caste groups in politics and society while constraining
members belonging to other groups. The next sections will
discuss specific informal institutions that contributed to the
exclusion of different marginalized groups.

Untouchability and the Exclusion of the Dalit
Even though caste discrimination and untouchability was
legally ended and made discrimination on those grounds a
punishable crime in the 1990 Constitution, the Dalit continue
to bear the brunt of the caste system due to untouchability,
which most Dalit face almost every day. The study on
Measuring Empowerment and Social Inclusion conducted by
the World Bank and the DFID (2006: 35) provides a good
sense of its prevalence: “When asked if she had entered the
homes of high caste people in her village, a Dalit woman in
Tanahun district laughed, ‘Not once! I’ve watched functions
of high-caste families from outside their windows.’”
Dalits are still prohibited to enter many temples, use
public water sources, and are forced to carry out traditional
occupations, such as disposing of dead animals. In 2005,
several Dalits were fined for entering temples in Saptari
district and those who could not pay were expelled from the
district (The World Bank and DFID 2006: 41), while in Siraha
district Dalits were forced to remove carcasses of dead animals
(Uprety, Rai, and Sedhain 2005). The data on untouchability/
caste discrimination collected by the Informal Service Center
(INSEC) shows that the practice of untouchability has gone
unabated (figure 2). The data represents events that produced
counter resistance related to the practice of untouchability.
It clearly demonstrates that incidents of untouchability that
have come to the attention of human rights groups have not
declined (INSEC 2008).14
Leaders of the ‘high’ caste groups have not treated Dalits
as political equals. The non-nomination of Dalits for public
13. Interviews, Kathmandu, summer 2007.
14. The low number of reported cases in the late nineties is probably
due to INSEC’s inexperience in collecting data on untouchability. INSEC
officials told me in the summer of 2008 that they began to collect data on
issues they felt important as they gained more experience in human rights
issues, and developed data collection methods on a trial and error basis.
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Figure 2: Reported Caste-based Discrimination

offices and the absence of progressive programs by major
political parties to end untouchability and promote inclusion
demonstrate this ambivalent attitude. As noted above, not
a single Dalit was made a minister during the 1990-02
democratic period. Likewise, only one Dalit was elected in
the three parliamentary elections (one out of a total of 615
possible seats).15
Educated, ‘high’ caste Nepalis often argue that
untouchability exists only in rural areas among the illiterate.
This is far from the truth. First, news of occasional public
feasts among Dalit and non-Dalit as campaigns against
untouchability in some urban areas demonstrates that the
practice is still prevalent enough for some progressive groups
to organize such events and become newsworthy. It is true
that untouchability has been reduced in urban areas but its
remnants still affect a large number of people, especially
women. An ethnographic study in the Kathmandu Valley in
2006 found that Dalit women could collect water from public
wells only after ‘high’ caste women to avoid ‘defilement’ of
water collected by the ‘high’ caste. A social boycott of a Dalit
woman, who broke the norms and complained about the
practice of untouchability to the authorities shows that the
practice is still socially enforced with severe consequences
even in urban areas. A fine of thousand rupees was levied by
the community to those who broke the boycott, due to which
the Dalit woman lost her tailoring business (Kharel 2007).
Dalits, including activists, have told me that they often
have to pretend to be a Bahun or Chhetri to rent apartments in
Kathmandu and have been asked to vacate office spaces after
the owners found out that they were Dalit. Folmar (2007) has
15. This does not, however, mean that the situation of Dalits has not
improved. Caplan (1972) had noticed in 1969 itself that Dalits had begun
to oppose Bahuns in a West Nepal village by supporting another faction
led by a lower ranked Jaisi Bahun, who they perceived as sympathetic,
after universal franchise was introduced in village elections. The decrease
in economic dependence of the Sarki (Cobblers) on the Bahuns and
demographic status of Sarki who were nearly half of the village also
facilitated the process. My argument is that Dalits have not become equal
citizens and still face major exclusion and discrimination.
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argued that presenting false identities as coping strategies at
the individual level has undermined empowerment of the
community because such people may hesitate to participate
inpublic actions for fear of being found out.
Second, Dalit activists claim that even many educated
individuals, who self-project as liberals and progressives,
still follow the practice of restricted commensality. Some
often claim helplessness when family members practice such
rituals and defend it as their family’s ‘human rights’ but do
not seem to notice glaring human rights violations by such
practices. Third, untouchability is problematic even if it
occurs only in rural areas. 86 percent of Nepal’s people live
in rural areas. A large number of people are associated with
the oppressive practice—as victims, active oppressors, or
passive participants.
Finally, untouchability deprives Dalits of equal economic
and other opportunities. Many jobs, professions and business
opportunities (such as opening tea stalls and selling milk)
available for enterprising rural people are not viable options
for Dalits because many members of the society may not buy
edible goods from them. Meanwhile, with penetration of the
market and the availability of cheaper readymade clothes,
shoes and metal farming implements, traditional sources
of income of the Dalit have been undermined (Blaikie,
Cameron, and Seddon 1980). Such constraints undermine
the development and social mobility of Dalits and contribute
to their exclusion from social and public life. A group whose
members face caste discrimination everyday and who are
deprived economically cannot be expected to be competitive
in politics and other realms.
This discussion has shown that the social practice of
untouchability contributes to exclude the Dalit directly
as well as indirectly by marginalizing them and making
them uncompetitive. The prevalence of untouchability
despite a constitutional ban shows that informal institutions
(untouchability) competed with ineffective formal institutions
(a Constitutional ban) to produce a divergent outcome of
continued widespread untouchability.

Ethnic/National Domination and the Exclusion of
Indigenous Nationalities
The indigenous nationalities were marginalized by the
dominant CHHEM societal norms that denigrated their
language, culture, religion, and lifestyles. The dominant
group considered the indigenous nationalities as ‘low’ caste,
even though they were not part of the caste system. The
assimilation policy and processes, vigorously promoted
under the guise of modernization and development during
the Panchayat era, projected dominant ethnic values,
worldviews, language, religion, culture and tradition as
Nepali and resulted in other groups and their attributes being
perceived as less Nepali and inferior. For example, people
who did not either know Khas-Nepali or lacked mastery over
it were often considered incompetent.
Domination along national/ethnic and religious
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dimensions can be assessed by analyzing stereotypes and
societal attitudes that denigrate the marginalized groups,
their values, culture, and lifestyles. Stereotyping is prevalent
in Nepali society toward both the dominated and dominant
groups but it hurts the dominated groups more because they
are not able to resist the impact of the demeaning portrayals.
Patriarchy, the caste system, and hill nationalism have
generated and reproduced stereotypes about the marginalized
groups (Neupane 2000; Thapa-Magar 2000; Acharya 1994;
Yadav 1997). Demeaning stereotyping is probably more
varied and severe towards indigenous groups because they are
more different than the dominant group in terms of culture,
language, religion, and physical appearance.16
Stereotyping portrays the marginalized group as deviant
because the groups do not possess the characteristics of the
dominant groups that have been established as normal/
universal (Young 1990). Hence, they are often considered
dumb, incompetent, lazy, and problematic, among other
things. In Nepal, stereotyping occurs at a number of levels.
Songs, proverbs, morals and folklores project the marginalized
communities negatively and the dominant group in superior
terms (Thapa-Magar 2000). For instance, popular songs
unabashedly use derogative words about marginalized
groups such as dalli magarni (round faced Magar belle) and
nepti (stub-nosed).17 The people who do not see any problem
with such songs react strongly if words like chucchi bahuni
(pointed nosed Bahuni) are used.18 Innumerable instances
of folklore and moral values depict indigenous nationalities,
women and Dalit as lazy, dirty, dumb, or undependable
(Mohsin et al. 2003; Neupane 2000).19 The demeaning
stereotypes are prevalent and they have been internalized
by the oppressed group members in many instances. For
instance, many Dalit and indigenous nationalities consider
that their ‘bad’ habits, such as alcohol consumption, are the
cause of their underdevelopment. That people of the same
stock with similar consumption habits have reached political
and economic prominence and performed better than the
CHHEM across the border in Sikkim and Darjeeling, show
the falsity of such views (Lawoti 2005).
People can develop and grow well in their own cultural
environment whereas discriminatory social attitudes
16. I do not discuss the Muslims even though the group is facing
similar cultural problems because of limited literature on the problems
facing the group.
17. A song - “maya kasle diyo nepti lai lightarra” (who gave a lighter to
the stub-nosed belle).
18. Derogative portrayals are found in the popular Khas-Nepali
literature as well. Pradeep Thapa-Magar (2000: 45-50) discusses a number
of protests by indigenous nationalities activists over demeaning portrayals of
the groups in the literary works like Silanyas (Bhimniddhi Tiwari), Dharanko
Ukali Orali (Madhav Prasad Pokhrel) and Sumnimma (B.P. Koirala).
19. The extent of derogatory proverbs used against the Dalit is such
that they are almost always presented as examples describing human frailties
and possessing negative habits and attributes.

Table 1: Variants of Informal Institutions, 1990-02
Outcomes/
Effectiveness

Effective Informal Institutions

Ineffective Formal Institutions

Convergent

Complementary

Substitutive

Unequal gender based inheritance laws &
patriarchaical practices;
Denial of citizenship to the Madhesi, and hill
nationalism;
Non-recognition of the Kirati religion in 1991
census

Divergent

Accommodating

Customary traditions that empower ethnic/
national groups in ‘multiethnic’ (as declared by
the Constitution) society

Competing
Exclusion of women, the Madhesi, indigenous,
& the Dalit in public offices (negative);
Prevalence of untouchability (negative);
Customary traditions & practices that promote
identity despite formal discouragement
(positive)

Framework adapted from Helmek and Levitsky (2006:14)

and practices constrain the growth and development of
different socio-cultural groups, debase cultures by negative
portrayal, and contribute to producing low self-esteem
among members of such groups (Kymlicka 1995). The
indigenous nationalities and others in Nepal were hindered
in social mobility and constrained in their development due
to discrimination against their culture, values, and traditions.
They were disadvantaged in competition with members of the
dominant groups in the CHHE biased cultural environment,
perpetuating their exclusion, including in politics.
The pervasive stereotyping, non-recognition of the culture
of marginalized groups and their treatment as ‘low caste’
demonstrates the role of competing informal institutions in
the exclusion of such groups in a constitutionally declared
‘multi-ethnic’ Nepal (see table 1). On the other hand, nonrecognition of religion of the indigenous nationalities (e.g.
Kirati) by the dominant group complemented the declaration
of the state as Hindu in the 1990 Constitution and helped to
produce convergent outcomes.

Hill Nationalism and the Exclusion of Madhesi
The exclusion of the Madhesi is unusual because the
Tarai is the most fertile region, which should have favored
the Madhesi in competitive socio-political spheres - in many
parts of the world people of the fertile plains perform better
politically and economically. The most blatant discrimination
against the Madhesi was in the citizenship realm. A
government commission calculated that 3.4 million Nepali
sixteen year olds and older—the majority of them Madhesi
—were without citizenship certificates in mid-1990s. This
discrimination in citizenship was not solely due to formal
laws that barred the Madhesi specifically from acquiring
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citizenship.20 The Madhesi became victims because the hill
dominated administration would often deny citizenship to the
Madhesi on the grounds that they were Indians. Even when
the Madhesi had all necessary documents, they faced long
delays in acquiring citizenship (Burkert 1997). The lack of
citizenship certificates, which were necessary for government
jobs, purchasing property and standing for public offices,
deprived the Madhesi of fundamental rights.
The consequence of the dominant strata’s discriminatory
attitude towards the Madhesi can be demonstrated more
clearly if access to the state by similar caste and ethnic groups
from the hill and Tarai communities are compared. If one
compares the Bahun (Hill Brahmin) and Tarai Brahmin, the
former has greater access to positions in the state. Similarly,
the hill Chhetri, indigenous nationalities, and the Dalit
enjoyed more access to the state than the Tarai Chhetri
(Thakur), indigenous nationalities, and the Dalit (table 2).
For instance, during the 1990s, not a single Tarai Dalit was
nominated to the powerless Upper House, which was one
agency where major political parties and the king sometimes
appointed one or two Dalits.
The source of discrimination and exclusion of the
Madhesi is the hill nationalism that did not recognize the
Madhesi as equal members of the Nepali nation-state. This
is akin to what Gramsci (1971: 195) had observed: “the State
renders the ruling group “homogeneous”, and tends to create
a social conformism which is useful to the ruling group’s line
of development.” The Nepali nation and nationalism was
20. An article of the 1990 constitution restricted citizenship to
only those whose father had a certificate. As many Madhesi were denied
citizenship certificates when it was distributed, their offspring were also
subsequently denied. These Nepalis were given citizenship certificates in
2007.
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defined along the traditions and identity of the hill people - it
a movement against the imposition of Khas-Nepali as the
was a regional-ethnic nationalism paraded as universal. The
only language of instruction in public schools in the Tarai
exclusionary nationalism was perpetuated through informal
during the 1950s. A Madhesi political party, the Nepal
attitudes of the hill residents and with support from formal
Tarai Congress, received 2.1 percent of the popular vote
institutions. The rituals and traditions that were promoted
in the 1959 election whereas the parties of the indigenous
to foster a sense of Nepali identity were mostly hill based.
nationalities collectively did not get comparable popular
Even though the Madhesi are Hindus, the hill controlled
votes even in 2008. The Madhesi began organizing during
state defined the Hinduism of the state along hill cultural
the Panchayat period as the Nepal Sadhvawana Parishad
lines, such as granting most public holidays on hill Hindu
(Nepal Goodwill Council), which transformed into a political
festivals (Mohsin et al. 2003).
party after 1990. The party elected Parliamentarians during
Hill nationalism is an informal institution because
all the three elections in the 1990s whereas the indigenous
the laws of the land do not formally declare Nepalis to be
nationalities and the Dalit parties did not elect a single
exclusively the hill people. The hill nationalists consider
member to the Parliament during the period. A higher level
the Madhesi as either Indians or recent migrants from
of mobilization of the Madhesi would suggest that the state
India and question their loyalty to the nation-state. These
and society would be responsive toward them. However, this
informal norms were reinforced in earlier periods by formal
was not so, because the hill nationalism was so strong that
laws. For instance, as mentioned earlier, though Brahmins
the hill society refused to recognize the Madhesi as equal
occupy the top positions in the Hindu caste hierarchy, the
Nepalis as long as they could afford do to so, that is until
1854 civil code put the Thakuri (Hill Kshatriya) above the
the 2007 Madhesi movement that paralyzed the country
Tarai Brahmin (Hofer 2004). This demonstrates that hill
through strikes.
nationalism was so strong that it even overrode the ritual
Specifically, the exclusion of the Madhesi occurred in
hierarchy prescribed by Hindu tradition.
four ways. First, people without citizenship certificates were
The Madhesi were not recognized as a genuine group
not eligible to stand for public positions. Second, attitudes
with specific problems by the hill community and the state
of suspicion toward the Madhesi meant that political leaders
or by the media and academia, which was dominated by hill
rarely appointed Madhesi to top public positions. Gaige
people during the 1990-02 democratic years. This non(1975) noted that the Nepali state would only appoint Madhesi
recognition of the Madhesi was so widespread that even the
officials even in the Tarai if they could not find hill people
1998 and 2004
for such positions.
Nepal
Human
Table 2: Access to the state by Madhesi/Tarai and Hill People
Likewise, due to
Development
the suspicion of
Reports
Group/Status
Less Access
Greater Access
Madhesi loyalty
(NESAC 1998;
to the state
‘High’ Caste Hindus
Madhesi/Tarai
Hill
UNDP 2004)
and prejudiced
and Unequal
perception
Indigenous Nationalities
Madhesi/Tarai
Hill
Citizens
that they are
(2006) which
cowards,
Dalit
Madhesi/Tarai
Hill
analyzed interthey were not
group
issues
recruited to the
Source: Mohsin et al. (2003)
(published
security forces,
respectively by
not only the
the UNDP and a consortium of the World Bank and DFID)
army but to the police forces as well. Third, the suspicion
did not treat the Madhesi as a separate group (Lawoti 2008).
and prejudice often created awkward and discomforting
The fallout of the non-recognition, in addition to symbolic
situations for the Madhesi and some left the mainstream
and material harm, was the absence of policies that redressed
political parties after it became unbearable. This reduced
the grievances of the Madhesis. For instance, development
the pool of Madhesi that could rise within major political
committees were established for the Dalit and indigenous
parties. Fourth, lack of access to social and state resources
nationalities during the late nineties and they were later
and socio-cultural discrimination rendered the Madhesi less
transformed into the Dalit Commission and an academy for
competitive politically.
the indigenous nationalities. For women, a separate ministry
The lack of recognition and discrimination interacted
was formed and quotas were set aside in the Upper House
in two ways with formal institutions. Non-recognition of
and local governments. Similar policies were not formulated
the Madhesi as equal citizens by the hill people competed
for the Madhesi.
with formal equal rights guarantees to citizens by the
The non-recognition is more surprising because the
Constitution while discriminatory attitudes and behavior
Madhesi were the most mobilized among the marginalized
of hill administrators complemented formal discriminatory
groups. Unlike the indigenous nationalities, they launched
citizenship laws to deny or delay citizenship certificates to
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a large number of Madhesi, which led to their socio-political
exclusion.

Informal Institutions and Inclusion
Some informal institutions in Nepal contributed to
inclusion, even though indirectly. For instance, the informal
norms of the indigenous nationalities operated to compete
with the formal institutions of the state and informal values
of the dominant group. The indigenous nationalities did not
completely adopt the values, norms and policies of the CHHEM
centric state that discriminated against them even though
they were influenced by the dominant group norms to some
extent, as demonstrated by Hinduization and Nepalization.
Customary tradition of ethnic/national groups that sustained
their identity and contributed to their mobilization and
empowerment is a substitutive informal institution.21 The
mobilization of marginalized groups, which was facilitated
by a distinct identity, forced some concessions from the state
and contributed to the project of socio-cultural mobilization
for inclusion after 1990. The practice of customary religious
traditions (e.g. Kirati, animist) despite their non-recognition
by the state is an example of competing informal institutions
that produce divergent outcomes to facilitate inclusion.
The emergence of the Kirati religion as a census category
is an example of how formal and informal institutions of
different groups interact in different ways to produce changes
in formal and informal institutions. As the ruling Hindus
considered Kiratis part of their religion, it was not listed as
a separate category in the census until 1991. This was a
case of formal and informal institutions of Hindus denying
recognition to a minority religion. However, in the 1991
census after the polity was opened, 1.7 percent of people
asserted Kirati as their religion in the ‘other’ category. The
census bureau was forced to include Kirati as a religious
category in the 2001 census when 3.6 percent said that they
follow it.
Thus, informal institutions produced both positive
(identity preservation, mobilization and some concessions to
marginalized groups) and negative (untouchability despite it
being declared illegal) outcomes. This paper, however, has
amply demonstrated that the informal institutions largely
contributed in the pervasive exclusion of various groups in
Nepal during the 1990-2002 democratic years.

Conclusion
This article demonstrates that informal institutions
interacted with formal institutions in various ways to
contribute significantly to the political exclusion in Nepal.
21. The accommodative informal institution category was not helpful
in describing and explaining the role of informal institutions in political
exclusion/inclusion in Nepal. If effective formal institutions exist, then it
may not be possible for informal institutions to produce divergent outcomes.
Thus, this study finds Lauth’s (2000) three-fold category more useful than
Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004; 2006) four-fold category.
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The Nepali case also sheds light on how informal institutions
contribute in creating new formal institutions or reforming
them and how they reproduce and get entrenched with the
help of formal institutions. For instance, the 1854 civil code
was introduced, among other reasons, to collate existing caste
practices in Kathmandu and in other areas of the country
and to systemize them according to the ruling elite values.
However, after the civil code was adopted and implemented,
the caste system spread around the country and became
more entrenched and began to operate in societies previously
not influenced by it. The system was so ingrained that even
after the caste based laws were formally ended in the 1960s,
its influence continues through informal mechanisms.
The aim of this paper is not to argue that all the problem
of political participation in Nepal are due to informal
institutions. Poverty and other socio-cultural factors play a
part in the political exclusion of social and ethnic groups.
However, informal institutions such as patriarchy, caste based
laws, cultural domination, and non-recognition significantly
contributed to the poverty of the marginalized groups, and
poverty in turn undermines their ability to mobilize for
their rights, challenge inequalities, and compete with the
dominant groups, demonstrating a circular causation.
The marginalized groups also engage in discriminatory
practices and norms. For example, inter group inequality
and discrimination is more severe in the Tarai between
caste Hindus and the Dalit. Practice of untouchability
exists among the Dalit themselves. Likewise, indigenous
nationalities also discriminate against each other and
towards the Dalit. Women in all groups face discrimination,
although to varying degrees. Caste, ethnicity, religion, class
and age, on the other hand, often put women in positions
of conflict with each other. However, intra and inter group
discrimination was often the result of the internalization
(through socialization) as well as the imposition of a
hierarchical caste system, exclusionary hill nationalism and
patriarchy, often structured along the values and interests
of the hill elite. The legal, social and structural framework
constrains marginalized groups from engaging in overt
challenges and contributes to their internalization of the
norms. Once the norms and values are internalized by even
the oppressed groups, they increase the effectiveness of the
informal institutions.
Nepal is undergoing a major transformation and it has
changed some formal institutions and may change many
others as the country adopts a new Constitution. Informal
institutions, however, take time to change. Attitudes and
traditions persist and are difficult to change overnight or
even over time. Thus, some forms of exclusion, produced
and reproduced by informal institutions, will probably
continue even in the ‘new Nepal.’ One way to lower exclusion
in the future would be to recognize the role of informal
institutions in exclusion and then devise formal institutions
that undermine them.
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